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ABSTRACT
Very low entry barriers and an exceptionally high degree of
competition characterize the market for mobile applications.
In such an environment one of the critical issues is how to
attract the attention of users. Practitioners and developers
are well aware that managing app updates (i.e., releasing
new versions of an existing app) is critical to increase app
visibility and to keep users engaged, disguising a hidden
strategy to stimulate downloads. We use unbalanced panel
data with characteristics for the top 1,000 apps on iTunes and
Google Play stores, for ﬁve European countries, to empirically
investigate publishers’ strategies concerning the release of
updates. We ﬁnd that only in the case of iTunes updates
boost downloads and are more likely to be released when
the app is experiencing poor performance. We interpret this
ﬁnding as evidence that the lack of quality control by Google
Play leads to an excess of updating of Android apps.
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•Applied computing → Economics;
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1. INTRODUCTION
The market for mobile applications is one of the most dy-
namic segments in today’s economy. In June 2016, more than
5 million apps were available on the various stores, which in-
clude Apple’s iTunes, Android’s Google Play and Microsoft’s
Windows Store. The growth in the number of available apps
∗An extensive version of this paper is available as [3].
has been accompanied by an exponential increase in down-
loads. According to Statista.com, the cumulative number
of apps downloaded from iTunes from July 2008 to June
2016 was about 130 billion. Also, in terms of the number of
developers and publishers involved in the app market, ﬁgures
are quite impressive. As stated by Priori (2014), in February
2014 more than 600 thousand developers published at least
one app on iTunes or Google Play. Indeed, producing and
distributing a mobile application for a developer is relatively
easy as it requires a small amount of investment to produce
computer software.
The market for mobile apps is therefore characterized on
the one hand by a fast growing demand from users and
on the other by low entry costs, a large number of apps
and developers, and high turnover rates. For these reasons
the app market has been deﬁned as a “hypercompetitive”
marketplace where developers struggle to attract adopters [4].
In this dynamic context, with several million apps available
for download, one of the most challenging problems faced by
developers is to catch the attention of users [1].
In order to improve app visibility, stores created the so-
called “top-ranked” apps charts, listing the most popular
applications. Several scholars have shown that such charts
promote the matching between users and developers with
top-ranked apps enjoying a remarkable boost in downloads
[2, 6, 7, 5]. In turn, top ranked-charts exacerbate another
feature characterizing app markets: the skewness of the dis-
tribution of downloads. According to www.appbrain.com,
on Google Play about 1 million apps out of 1.4 million have
less than one thousand downloads each, while by compari-
son just thirteen thousand apps have more than one million
downloads. Being in the top positions guarantees success.
Therefore, the distribution of downloads is extremely skewed
to the right with only a small fraction of applications captur-
ing most of the market. This feature is conﬁrmed in our data
as highlighted in Figure 1, which displays the distribution of
downloads for the top 100 apps in Germany for iTunes and
Google Play; the two diagrams show the average number of
downloads for each decile of the distribution. In the case of
Google Play, for instance, the average number of monthly
downloads of apps of the ﬁrst decile is 436,674, which is twice
the average number of monthly downloads of apps in the
second decile (214,594) and about eight times more than the
downloads of tenth decile (58,690).
(a) iTunes (b) GP
Figure 1: Distribution of downloads
To climb the top-ranked charts and to improve the visibility
of their apps, publishers and developers look for any possible
marketing and pricing strategy. In this article we focus on a
very speciﬁc strategy that developers may exploit to attract
users’ attention: the release of frequent updates.
Our data-set conﬁrms that both on iTunes and on Google
Play updates are released with an extremely high frequency:
Google Play apps are updated on average every 13 days, while
those on iTunes every 58 days. A more exhaustive way of
presenting diﬀerences in updates by stores is by plotting the
hazard function. In Figure 2 we display the estimated hazard
function for updates by store, with months on the horizontal
axes. We see clearly that Google Play apps are more likely
to be updated than iTunes apps, i.e. each app version in
Google Play tends to be of younger age. The diﬀerence is
striking, as highlighted by the diﬀerent domains for the two
stores. Continuous updates is not a surprising feature, as
it is widely recognized that by releasing updates developers
stimulate user’s interest. Usually, developers promote the
new versions of their products on blogs, social networks or
simply in the “What’s new” section of the app store and this
stimulates app visibility and, via this channel, sales.
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We analyze the strategy of releasing frequent updates by
exploiting the diﬀerences across the two main app stores,
iTunes and Google Play. Interestingly, the two stores follow
diﬀerent policies regarding the publication of apps and up-
dates; while Apple has adopted very strict guidelines and
closely monitors the release of new apps and updates to avoid
low quality apps being uploaded on iTunes, on Google Play
apps can be published with a “simple click of the mouse” and
without a quality-check control. As a matter of fact Google
Play apps are often criticized for their poor quality.1
In this paper, we provide intuition of a stylized theoreti-
cal model which investigates the developer’s decision about
whether to update her mobile application.2 We then sum-
marize the results of the empirical analysis based on an
unbalanced panel with characteristics on the top 1,000 apps
on iTunes and Google Play stores for ﬁve European countries;
the analysis aims at empirically testing the predictions we
derive from the theoretical model.
The main result from our paper is that the diﬀerence
in quality control between iTunes and Google Play have
implications on developers’ decision to update their app and
on their app performance.
Our paper ﬁts into an emerging literature focussing on app
updates. [11] surveyed 690 individuals (among developers
and users) in order to study the speciﬁc release strategies
followed by app publishers. [9] and [10] focus on updates in
Google Play and Windows Phone app stores. They ﬁnd that
40% of the releases in Google Play and 55% of the releases
in Windows Phone have an impact on app performance,
measured in terms of rating, ratings counts and download
rank. Interestingly, the authors also ﬁnd that the release
text content matters. Updates highlighting new features
(rather than bug ﬁxes) are found to be more likely to impact
positively on app performance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
the data and some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses
the theoretical framework presenting a simple numerical
example. The results of the empirical investigation are dis-
cussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE DATA
In the analysis, we use monthly data on the 1,000 most
downloaded apps in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the
UK. Data was obtained from the Berlin-based consulting
analytics Priori; the period of observation is September 2013-
February 2014.
The dataset contains information on the following variables:
name of the app, name of the publisher, app monthly and
overall number of downloads by country, average customer
rating of the app (scale from 1 to 5), the number of times
the app was rated by users, the date of release of the app on
the store, the cumulated number of versions (updates) of the
app, the price of the app, whether the app has the in-app
purchase option (0− 1 variable) and, ﬁnally, whether an app
is “local” (0− 1 variable).3
All the information, but downloads, was obtained directly
from the Google Play and iTunes app stores. Downloads were
computed by Priori using proprietary metrics; estimating a
relationship among downloads, indicators of the performance
(e.g. user rating) and other publicly available information
(e.g. ﬁnancial statements or reputable press releases).4 Only
ﬁrst-time installations are counted as downloads.
1www.appbrain.com estimates that nearly 15% of Google
Play apps are of low quality.
2The model, as well a thorough econometric analysis, is
developed in [3].
3An app is deﬁned as local in a given country if 40% or more
of its all time downloads occur in that country.
4For a sample of apps, Priori cross-checked these estimates
by using real downloads data provided by partner developers.
For iTunes apps we complemented the data provided by
Priori, recording information available on the App Annie
web site (see www.appannie.com). This additional informa-
tion includes: type of updates distinguishing between major
updates (new versions of the software with signiﬁcant jumps
in the functionalities) and minor ones (new versions that ﬁx
bugs to avoid crashing),5 the type of compatibility (Universal
apps, apps for iPad only, for iPhone ...), the size of the app
code as of May 2014 (data collection period), the age restric-
tions (4+, 9+, 12+, 17+) and whether the app was available
in the language of the country or not. We also classiﬁed
iTunes apps into “corporate apps” or not, where corporate
apps are the apps representing an additional distribution
channel (e.g. airlines or banking apps, newspaper or TV
network apps etc.) or a tool aimed at spreading information
about the services supplied by a company.
With only the exception of downloads (and ranking), all
the available information is country invariant. For this reason
we aggregate the data; hence, monthly downloads (and the
growth in downloads) are the sum of the downloads in the ﬁve
European countries in a given month. Summary statistics
for the two stores are provided in Table 1.6 It is interesting
to note that:
- most of the top apps are free of charge. This is the
case of nearly all Google Play apps and of more than
90% of the apps in iTunes.
- For a signiﬁcant share of apps the in-app purchase
option is available. This occurs for 29.7% of the cases
in Google Play and for 56.1% in iTunes.
- Apps in both stores have a quite large user rating (above
4 out of 5). This observation is rather unsurprising
provided that we are focussing on the most successful
apps. The number of times an app has been rated is
larger in Google Play (the ﬁgure is about twice as big
as in iTunes).
- On average, apps in iTunes are older than in Google
Play: 19 months compared to 15.
- Apps are updated very frequently in both stores. On
average in Google Play apps are updated about 33
times since their publication, while this ﬁgure reduces
to about 10 in iTunes.
- Downloads are much higher in Google Play than in
iTunes, with Google Play apps on average downloaded
nearly ﬁve times more than iTunes apps (249,803 com-
pared with 58,156).
- Roughly 35% of apps generate at least 40% of their
revenues in one country, i.e. they are local (similar
ﬁgure in both stores).
5We were able to collect this information by looking at
the three-digit code of the various versions. Programmers
assign a unique three-digit number to each new version of
the software. So, for example, version 2.12.4 means that
there have been two major updates and sixteen minor ones
(12+4).
6Since in several cases, the same app appears in the top
1,000 in more than one country in a given month, from the
original 30,000 observations per store (1,000 apps, during 6
months, in 5 countries) we are left with 15,983 observations
for Google Play, and 14,755 for iTunes.
- On average, in Google Play, a single developer dis-
tributes about 3 top-ranked apps. The ﬁgure for iTunes
is 3.5.
- On average, an app enters the top-1,000 ranking in
about 2 out of 5 countries in both stores (1.876 in
Google Play and 2.030 in iTunes).
- In iTunes, about 2 out of 10 updates are major updates.
Our data conﬁrms a couple of features that have already
been found in the literature [1]: i) downloads exhibit an ex-
tremely skewed distribution, with top apps accounting for a
large fraction of total downloads, and ii) large turnover/churn,
with few applications which succeed in staying in the top
1,000 list in all the six months of observation. Regarding
feature i), we have already shown Figure 1 the distribution
of downloads for the top 100 apps in Germany for iTunes
and Google Play; the distribution of downloads in the other
countries of the sample is very similar.
Where feature ii) is concerned, Table 2 displays the high
level of turnover that characterizes iTunes. The overall
number of diﬀerent apps that we observe during the six-
month period in the ﬁve countries is 10,986;7 18.24% of
these apps are observed every month (indicated in the table
with“All months”). However, a substantial percentage (about
44%) of apps appear only in one month. The level of turnover
is even larger in Google Play (table not reported). For the
Android store, the overall number of applications that we
observe increases to 13,034 and the share of apps that appears
only one month is about 50%.
Another way of looking at turnover is through the volatility
of app performance. Figure 3 focuses on apps that appear
only once in our six-month period of observation; more specif-
ically, the ﬁgure focusses on iTunes apps in Germany,8 and
shows the ranking of apps (grouped into groups of twenty)
that entered the top 1,000 for only one month (and were not
listed before or after that month).9 We observe that the dis-
tribution is highly concentrated on high values of the ranking
especially in position between 800 and 1,000). This evidence
reinforces the observation app performance can be highly
volatile and characterized by huge jumps in downloads.
3. A SIMPLE THEORETICAL MODEL
In [3] we develop a very stylized theoretical framework
aimed at providing the main intuition for our econometric
analysis. The theoretical model incorporates three important
features characterizing the app economy. First, given the
huge number of available apps, performance (both in terms
of downloads and usage) depends not only on the technical
quality of the software code and on its ability to meet user
needs but also on the ability of publishers to make their
apps visible, to stimulate “buzz” surrounding their apps.
The second feature of the model is based on the evidence
7The minimum number of apps we could have observed in
our sample is 1,000 (if the top 1,000 apps are the same in the
ﬁve countries during the whole period) while the maximum
is 30,000 (if the top 1,000 apps change every month and are
diﬀerent in the ﬁve countries under observation).
8We obtained similar diagrams for the apps of the other
countries and the patterns were similar.
9Figure 3 was obtained by dropping the initial and last month
of observation in order to spot apps that truly entered the
top 1,000 ranking only once.
Table 1: Summary statistics from the ﬁve countries
Google Play iTunes
N. mean std. dev. N. mean std. dev.
Priori data
Free 15,983 0.999 0.033 14,755 0.917 0.276
Price (if free=0) 17 2.447 1.148 1,229 2.759 2.907
In-app 15,983 0.297 0.457 14,755 0.561 0.496
Local 15,983 0.374 0.484 14,755 0.349 0.477
Age (in months) 15,983 15.036 13.993 14,755 19.341 15.991
Number of updates (all time) 15,983 33.430 78.487 14,755 10.079 9.990
Update (sampling period) 7,991* 0.542 0.498 8,531 0.453 0.498
# apps same developer 15,983 2.983 4.583 14,755 3.586 5.163
Number countries 15,983 1.876 1.395 14,755 2.030 1.491
Monthly downloads 15,983 249,803 1,244,139 14,755 58,156 166,472
Growth downloads** 8,225* -0.026 0.763 8,591 -0.160 0.646
App Annie data
Age major version (in months) 13,723 10.536 9.924
Number major versions 13,852 2.055 2.004
Update major version 8,175 0.037 0.189
Size 13,851 63.934 149.595
*Updates and growth are in ﬁrst diﬀerences and hence have less observations.
**Growth rates are expressed as log changes.
Table 2: Pattern of apps, iTunes, all periods and
countries
Freq. % Cum. Pattern
2,004 18.24 18.24 All months
1,098 9.99 28.24 Sept only
1,025 9.33 37.57 Feb only
762 6.94 44.50 Oct only
755 6.87 51.37 Nov only
637 5.80 57.17 Jan only
592 5.39 62.56 Dec only
423 3.85 66.41 Sept & Oct
354 3.22 69.63 Dec, Jan & Feb
3,336 30.37 100.00 (other patterns)
10,986 100.00 N. of diﬀerent apps
Figure 3: Distribution of downloads
that, as discussed, performance is highly skewed with a
limited number of apps able to capture most of the returns.
Finally, in the model we assume that the release of an update
stimulates the “buzz” surrounding the app: bloggers, social
networks and users are more likely to be attracted by an
app, and therefore to comment on, when a new version is
available for download. Note, however, that this increase in
buzz does not necessarily translate into positive comments;
as a matter of fact, users and experts might not welcome
the changes made in the software and this may induce them
to criticize the update, thus generating what we deﬁne as
negative buzz. Formally, we assume that the release of the
new version of the software increases the buzz surrounding
the app and, at the same time, it makes more uncertain how
the app is perceived by users.
We use the theoretical model to derive a series of testable
predictions; the following numerical example provides the
intuition of the model. App performance depends on the
perceived quality of the app, which, in turn, is aﬀected by the
intrinsic/technical quality of the software code as well as by
the buzz surrounding it. App returns are highly skewed: they
can be very low or very large depending on the ability of the
developer to hit certain thresholds in app perceived quality.
Formally, app returns are 0 if the app perceived quality is
below the threshold of 75, while they equal 1, 000 in the
case the perceived quality is larger than 75. The perceived
quality of the app is not deterministic and it is aﬀected by
the buzz. Let us assume that the current version of the
software turns out to have a high perceived quality equal to
100 with probability 1/2 and a low perceived quality equal to
60 with complementary probability. If the developer decides
to release a new version of the software the buzz surrounding
the app is larger and the perceived quality more uncertain.
Speciﬁcally, let us assume that the perceived quality of the
update is:
⎧⎨
⎩
120 with probability 1/4
80 with probability 1/2
0 with probability 1/4
Comparing the two versions of the software, it turns out
that the current one has a higher expected perceived quality,
80 compared to 70. However, only the high realizations of
the perceived quality matter provided that low realizations
yield no returns. Hence, the developer prefers to release an
update given that the 1, 000 in returns will materialize with
probability 3/4 (the probability that the perceived quality
is, at least, 75) while they materialize with probability 1/2
without the update. In other words, the developer ﬁnds it
proﬁtable to update their app even though the new version
of the software has a smaller expected perceived quality.
The model suggests that, given the peculiar features of the
app market, publishers might have incentives to release new
versions of their app even if they oﬀer little/no improvement
to the technical/intrinsic quality of the software. The release
of a low quality update is more likely to take place when the
current version of the software is expected to have a worsening
in its performance. In this case, the publisher knows that
with a large probability low returns will be generated and,
therefore, she/he has all the incentive to update the app in an
attempt to revive it. This “bet for resurrection’ strategy” is
more likely to be feasible for developers operating in Google
Play (compared to those operating in iTunes) where there
is no quality control and where, therefore, also low-quality
updates can be released.
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
The main message of the model is that the diﬀerences in
quality control between iTunes and Google Play may have im-
portant consequences on developers’ decisions to update their
apps and on the eﬀects of such decisions on performance. We
use our data to test the predictions of the theoretical analysis;
in our empirical analysis, we approximate app performance
with downloads.
Figure 4 provides a preliminary picture of the evidence
of the diﬀerent role of updates in stimulating downloads in
Google Play and in iTunes. The ﬁgure shows the kernel den-
sity of the growth in downloads in the two stores distinguish-
ing between updated and non-updated apps.10 Interestingly,
in Google Play the two density functions nearly perfectly
overlap; this suggests that updated and non-updated apps
perform very similarly in terms of downloads. On the con-
trary, in iTunes the density function of non-updated apps is
more asymmetric to the left and concentrated on negative
values of the growth rate of downloads. Hence, updates seem
to improve app performance in iTunes, while they have no
substantial impact in Google Play.
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Figure 4: Download growth density function
10Growth rates are expressed in logarithms and refer to the
overall number of downloads each app obtains in the ﬁve
countries.
In order to better understand the role of updates, for each
store separately, in [3] we study the dynamics of the rate of
growth of downloads (g) and of the decision to release an
update (u). Our econometric speciﬁcation is, therefore, made
of two equations: the growth equation, where we study the
determinants of download growth, and the update equation,
where we study the determinants of the release of updates.
Speciﬁcally, the equations are modeled as a linear autore-
gressive processes of lag 1 and in the estimations we take
the ﬁrst diﬀerences in order to eliminate app unobserved
heterogeneity, which may be correlated with the lagged de-
pendent variable and the contemporaneous outcome of the
app update. Thus in our estimates we regress the following
econometric simultaneous equations:
Δgjt =φ11Δgj,t−1 + φ12Δujt + τ1t +Δx1jtβ1 +Δε1jt
Δujt =φ21Δgj,t−1 + φ22Δuj,t−1 + τ2t +Δx2jtβ2 +Δε2jt,
(1)
where τ indicates a function of time; the vector x includes a
set of control variables, and the last term, ε, is the idiosyn-
cratic error term. We tackle the endogeneity of Δgj,t−1, Δujt
and Δuj,t−1, by selecting a set of instruments that exploit
the time series dimension of the panel and the fact that a
sizeable number of developers distribute several apps in the
top 1,000 ranking. The selected instruments are tested for
their relevance and validity.
As regards the growth equation, we ﬁnd that the release
of an update positively aﬀects downloads in iTunes while
it has no signiﬁcant impact in Google Play.11 This result
conﬁrms the preliminary evidence shown in Figure 4. We
interpret this ﬁnding in terms of the institutional diﬀerences
characterizing the two stores. As argued, only in iTunes there
is a strict quality check for apps and updates. Therefore, the
absence of a signiﬁcant impact of updates in Google Play
might be due to the fact that in this store both high and
low-quality updates get published so that the overall eﬀect
on downloads is not signiﬁcant.
We also ﬁnd that, similar to the evidence shown in [8],
the growth rate of downloads increases with the number of
other applications by the same developer. We refer to this as
“portfolio eﬀects”, which we interpret as a signal of developers’
ability to exploit the presence of complementarities among
apps.
As regards the update equation, our theoretical analysis
suggests that an important determinant of the developers’
decision to release a new version of an app is its past per-
formance: an update is more likely to be released when
the developer observes a worsening of the performance of
the current app. In the estimations we measure the past
performance of an app in terms of lagged growth rate of
downloads. Our data conﬁrm this prediction only for iTunes
apps; for Google Play, the past performance does not have
an impact on the decision to release an update. Again, we
interpret this diﬀerence between the two stores on the ba-
sis of the diﬀerence in quality control between iTunes and
Google Play. Since iTunes apps must pass a quite severe
quality control, developers are less free to publish updates:
developers who have written an update may therefore decide
to delay publication until it is really necessary, i.e. when
11A detailed presentation of these results as well as additional
robustness checks are in [3].
the performance of the app worsens it triggers a response
to counter the drop in downloads. In contrast, on Google
Play, developers can publish apps any time they want with
a simple click of the mouse. In this environment, updates
are continuously published, thus diluting the impact of past
performance on the decision to release a new version of the
app.
For iTunes apps, we have been able to distinguish between
major (i.e. signiﬁcant changes in functionalities) and minor
updates (i.e. bug ﬁxing and minor changes to the software
code). Therefore, we run separate regressions of both the
growth and the update equations distinguishing between
major and minor updates. We ﬁnd that both types of updates
positively impact the growth rate of downloads; at the same
time, we ﬁnd that the worsening of app performance increases
the likelihood of releasing minor updates only. This ﬁnding
suggests that minor updates are better suited to be used
as a strategic tool to counter poor past performances. The
results of these estimates are available in the full version of
the paper [3]
5. CONCLUSION
App developers release new versions of their mobile appli-
cations with an extremely high frequency. In this paper, we
focus on app updates and present a stylised model describing
the determinants of the decision to release a new version of
the software; our analysis suggests that updates might be
published strategically in order to revive apps and stimulate
the buzz surrounding them. An interesting insight of our
theoretical framework is that when an app experiences very
poor performance, a developer might be tempted to release
even a low quality update, in the hope of reversing the trend.
The discussion of an empirical analysis undertaken in
[3] has shown that updates play a quite diﬀerent role in
stimulating downloads on iTunes than do on Google Play:
while in the former updates boost downloads, their eﬀect is
not signiﬁcant in the latter. These results are consistent with
our conjecture, that the lack of a quality check on Google
Play can cause a phenomenon of too frequent updating:
developers release both high and low quality updates, which,
on average, do not impact downloads.
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